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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s mandate gives it the unique authority to 
maintain international peace and security. Made up of ten nonpermanent rotating and five 
permanent Member States (P5), the UNSC gives this decision making power to less than 
eight percent of the Member States of the UN at a time, five of whom never change. It 
has long been argued that the P5 represent a power distribution of the world as it existed 
in 1945, directly after World War II, and has not kept up with changing membership and 
power dynamics. This paper analyzes the history of the Council, efforts for its reform, 
and the legitimacy of the body as a whole by looking at Brazil’s bid for permanent 
representation through the Group of Four’s proposal.  
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2 
Introduction 
The premier organ of the United Nations (UN) charged with ensuring 
international peace and security is the Security Council. Created in 1945, the Security 
Council (UNSC)’s membership is composed of ten nonpermanent, rotating Member 
States from all regions of the world which are nominated by their regional organizations 
and elected by the General Assembly (GA) every two years. The arguably more 
important aspect of the Council, however, is the Permanent Five (P5) members: the 
People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the United States of America (USA). These 
countries’ seats are guaranteed in the Charter, which provides each with a veto on any 
substantive issue before the Council. This permanent representation and veto power has 
been called into question throughout the body’s existence, yet reform has only occurred 
once, in 1966.  
The permanent representatives, many States argue, represent an outdated 
depiction of the distribution of power across the globe as it was immediately following 
WWII. This antiquated power structure has led to calls for reform from notable 
individuals and States alike. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan claimed that "we 
have not yet achieved the sweeping and fundamental reform that I and many others 
believe is required […] I urge you... to have patience to persevere, and the vision needed 
to forge a real consensus," in his 2005 speech to the UN General Assembly (GA) in 
which he introduced his plans for reform.
1
 Additionally, growing international powers 
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and allies of the P5 are publically confirming a preference for regional action over UNSC 
decisions involving peacekeeping and the use of force. The United States recognizes 
these debates as problematic, noting that while it is unlikely that Member States which 
are dissatisfied would launch a “full-scale assault on the UNSC’s legitimacy and seek to 
undermine its role,” it is not unreasonable to think that those States who desire 
representation and are not granted it could “reduce their investments in – and diplomatic 
support for – the institution, depriving the UNSC of needed capabilities and its overall 
effectiveness.”2 
However, the P5 have historically denied the need for formal reform of the 
Council. In 1991, a US delegate to the UN said “it ain’t broke – don’t fix it” when asked 
about UNSC reform.
3
 Because a change to the Council would require passing votes in 
both the GA and UNSC, acquiescence by all P5 States would by necessary to avoid a 
veto which would stop any chance of reform. Yet the P5 often hold very different or even 
opposing ideological views of the United Nations and its function. Therefore, managing 
to meet the desires of each permanent member of the Council as well as the majority of 
the General Assembly is a major undertaking. 
In order for the Security Council to maintain its ability to influence international 
peace and security and move forward with other reform movements related to mission 
fulfillment, it is essential that the global community continue to see the body as 
legitimate. This legitimacy is most often discussed as a function of membership. The 
United Nations is being afforded a valuable opportunity through formal reform to make 
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great strides in enhancing its legitimacy. This study provides insight as to the future 
possibility of reform and expansion of the most powerful international organization in the 
world. 
History of the United Nations and its Reform 
At the United Nations’ creation in 1945, the Security Council was intended to be 
the most powerful international body, charged with the “maintenance of international 
peace and security” and was made up of eleven States from around the world.4 Of these 
eleven States, the five most powerful held permanent seats on the Council as well as a 
substantive veto on any resolution which interfered with particular foreign policies or 
views of the purpose of the body. These five States – China, France, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America – represented the power structure 
of the world at the end of the Second World War. Indeed, these five States were the first 
to develop nuclear weapons, starting with the United States during the war and ending 
with China’s development of nuclear capabilities in 1964.5  
However, the world has a vastly different composition than it did in 1945 and 
many experts question the legitimacy of the United Nations, particularly that of the 
Security Council, which maintains the authority to deploy military forces, instate 
sanctions, and generally impose its will upon the world. Only 65 sovereign States existed 
before the Second World War.
6
 After the war, the world entered a period of rapid State 
development as a result of a movement toward decolonization. Before the end of the Cold 
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War, another 95 States declared their independence.
7
 Finally, since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, there have been 27 additional independent States recognized by the 
international community.
8
  
Clearly, the Charter of the United Nations was written before the population of 
sovereign States more than tripled, yet very few modifications to the body’s founding 
document have occurred. In fact, only four Articles of the Charter have been amended 
since 1945. The most recent amendment of the UN Charter occurred in 1973, enlarging 
the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54 Member States.
9
  
The only formal expansion of the UNSC was its enlargement in 1966, increasing 
the amount of nonpermanent seats in the Council from six to ten.
10
 However, there has 
been little change to the structure of the Council or its permanent membership. China’s 
representation changed in 1971 after the split between the People’s Republic of China 
and what is now known as Taiwan.
11
  Additionally, Russia has held the seat which was 
reserved for the Soviet Union since the breakup of the USSR since 1991.
12
 These 
changes, though highly political, did not meaningfully change the power structure in the 
Council as the replacements simply reflected the new reality of the original charter.  
Though UNSC membership is one of the major aspects of the Council of any 
discussion of United Nations reform, it is not the only one. Other topics brought to these 
conversations include transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and flexibility in 
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6 
order to “deliver results to those most in need, do more with what we have and strengthen 
accountability.”13 These goals are related to the operation of the organization rather than 
the membership itself and, though all reform issues are interrelated, are often separate 
discussions. It is, however, important to understand reform priorities as a whole to 
understand the context of discussions of reform through membership modifications.  
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 “Strengthening The UN,” United Nations, accessed March 28, 2015, 
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Literature Review 
 Scholars have recognized the importance of reform in both the Security Council’s 
structure and its operations. However, there is debate on how this reform could happen 
and the limits to potential reform of the body. These limitations are both structural and 
political and seriously constrain the international community’s ability to reform the body. 
The following scholars have explored the body’s membership, legitimacy, and reform 
plans. This literature discusses both the Council itself and the concept of legitimacy. 
The United Nations’ History of Expansion 
In his 2009 analysis of the Security Council’s history and development, David 
Bosco of American University conducted a deep study of the Council’s purpose and 
outlook moving forward into the 21
st
 century. Bosco claims the 1966 expansion of the 
Council was a response to threats by a large section of the General Assembly, including 
those associated with the nonaligned movement, to fill the nonpermanent Council seats 
with States who would be hostile to the P5 and their interests.
 14
 The 1966 addition of 
four nonpermanent seats provided precedence of reform which may be more dramatic. 
Malaysia was named the GA’s president in 1996 and declared that UN reform would be a 
major priority of the organization; in his speech to accept the yearlong term, Razali 
Ismael declared that the “whole history of the UN… leading on to the sorry state it is in 
now, has been that it is used by the major powers” in an appeal to the UN to seriously 
tackle reform during his term. 
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As discussions of reform began, Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt, 
Nigeria, and South Africa all voiced a desire to be considered as a potential new 
permanent member in the Council.
15
 The desire for increased permanent representation, 
especially in regions which were currently unrepresented such as Latin America and 
Africa, was not a new concept. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt saw a need for more holistic 
representation in the Council in 1945 when he suggested Brazil have a permanent seat in 
addition to the existing P5.
16
 Regardless of the iteration and combination of States 
proposed for additional representation, it is clear that the system as it exists is imperfect. 
 Legitimacy within International Organizations 
 In Legitimizing International Organizations, Dominik Zaum explores the concept 
of legitimacy in the international sphere and has determined that there are three main 
reasons why this study is important. The first of these reasons is recognizing and 
understanding the importance of hierarchy. The hierarchy Zaum speaks of explains how 
States view themselves in international politics and how they view the recommendations 
and pressures from non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).
17
 The second reason is the increased presence 
of international organizations in the formation of domestic policy.  This increased 
presence constrains States in their development of domestic policies and actions.
18
 After 
Westphalia, the idea of international influence on domestic action is unexpected and 
complicated. Although, as international organizations such as the UN gain legitimacy and 
people begin to see themselves as global citizens rather than simply citizens of their 
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respective states, the global arena has more importance and influence which must be 
heeded. The third reason is that rapid social evolution has created gaps in legitimacy of 
international organizations who struggle to keep up with changing social norms and 
ideas.
19
  
 Zaum specifically discusses the legitimation of the Security Council in this book 
and analyzes the efforts of the Council itself as well as the individual States which serve 
on the Council permanently or on a rotating basis as well as States who are simply 
general members of the United Nations General Assembly. Zaum sees the process of 
legitimizing the Council as needing improvement in the areas of efficiency in responding 
to crises, reducing tensions between Member States of the Council, and reconciling the 
differences in expectations of the Council that different individuals and states may 
have.
20
  
Terrance Chapman sees the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs) such 
as the UNSC as coming, in part, from public opinion. Governments have typically felt 
constrained by public opinion in developing domestic policy. However, Chapman asserts 
that states which abide by international guidelines and act multilaterally actually 
experience public opinion benefits.
21
 These benefits come from a perceived advantage to 
acting in concert with other states. Chapman analyzed public opinion in P5 states, 
specifically the United States, during military actions taken by the country. The results of 
this analysis found that when US military actions were taken in conjunction with a UN 
Security Council resolution, the president’s approval ratings rose much more than when 
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 Terrance L. Chapman, "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy,." International 
Organization 63, no. 4 (2009): 733-64. 
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military operations took place without UN support.
22
 This suggests that there is a level of 
legitimacy of the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, which extends to 
support of the organization’s actions. 23 
Major Existing Plans for Reform 
The Razali Plan, according to Brian Cox, was the “first comprehensive reform 
plan produced” by the Open-Ended Working Group which convened in 1992 with 
A/RES/47/62.
24
The Razali Plan, now a historical one, proposed adding both permanent 
and non-permanent seats in a combination of developed and developing States to the 
Council in the form of permanent seats for developing Member States from Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America and two “industrialized states” from any region.25 These five 
permanent Member States would also come with four non-permanent seats from each of 
the following regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
26Razali’s plan was one of the first to create a tangible plan for reform, though 
it failed to address more contentious aspects of reform, including the veto and term limits. 
Regardless of this, Razali’s term as GA president brought UN reform, and that of the 
Security Council, to the forefront of minds across the world and planted the seed for the 
reform of the body to be a topic of discussion on the UN’s agenda.  
After the 1990s, the next major push for reform came from UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan in 2003. Annan produced a high-level report once again calling for reform 
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11 
which provided readers with two separate proposals for reform: Model A and Model B.
27
 
Model A proposed the addition of six permanent and three non-permanent seats to the 
Council. The permanent seats, added without a veto, would consist of “two for Africa; 
two for Asia; one for Europe; and one for the Americas.”28 This model did not, however, 
specifically determine which countries in the aforementioned regions should fill regional 
seats. Model B, on the other hand, simply sought to add nine non-permanent seats to the 
Council, though these additional seats would differ from existing rotating seats.
29
 
Annan’s Model B would create four-year rotating seats which would be immediately 
eligible for reelection. In contrast, the existing seats have two year terms which do not 
provide the possibility for reelection immediately following a term.  
Annan’s report did not specifically name Member States to be considered for 
representation. These Models were more specific than other plans which existed at the 
time, however, in that he provided suggestions for the qualifications for representation. 
Annan suggested Member States “among the top three financial contributors” or “the top 
three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping 
missions.”30 
This suggestion may have provided inspiration to the next major proposal for 
reform. The Group of Four (G4) consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan who 
support each other’s bid for permanent representation on the Council. These four States 
additionally support the addition of two permanent seats to be provided to Africa and 
named by the African region. Interestingly, if Annan’s suggestion were to be 
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12 
implemented, it may very well look like such a proposal. Brazil is the top contributor to 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and India is the third largest 
DPKO contributor in the world while Germany is the third largest financial contributor to 
the UN and Japan the second.
31
 These provide justifications to the international 
community which many consider difficult to dispute. 
This is not to say, however, that the Group of Four Proposal is without critics. The 
most vocal of these critical States have formed together to create the Uniting for 
Consensus group, also known as the Coffee Club. These States, including Italy, 
Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea, favor reform similar to 
Annan’s Model B. Rather than adding permanent representation to the Council, the 
Uniting for Consensus group would add ten regional, non-permanent seats. These 
additions would allow regional groups to find greater representation without giving States 
permanent seats which may hinder swift decision-making. Many of the Uniting for 
Consensus group and its allies additionally see the G4 as problematic in their own right. 
This has created tensions between the two groups which have yet to be solved. 
While most plans for reform recognize the need for African representation, few 
determine what such representation should look like and none include African States as 
collaborators in finding a solution. The Ezulwini Consensus is the African response to 
such disparity. The Ezulwini Consensus would expand the Council to 26 – the largest 
proposed addition. The 11 additions to the Council would include “two permanent and 
two non-permanent states from Africa; two permanent and one non-permanent state from 
Asia; one non-permanent Eastern Europe State; one permanent and one non-permanent 
                                                 
31
 United Nations Peacekeeping, Troop and Police Contributors. 
13 
state from Latin America and the Caribbean; and one permanent seat from Western 
Europe and other states” with permanent Member States being selected from their own 
respective regional groups.
32
 The Ezulwini plan is unique in that it is one of the only 
recent proposals which still seeks to provide a veto to new permanent members. 
Obstacles to Council Reform  
Ian Hurd aptly notes that “Council reform proposals often look transparently 
political and selfserving” when discussing opponents to various reform proposals.33 It can 
be difficult to distinguish between proposals brought forth as the best possible solution to 
UNSC deficiencies and self-interested opportunities for national advancement. Hurd sees 
Italy’s resistance to German representation as “entirely predictable.”34 Additionally, Hurd 
argues that the argument of legitimacy is a false one. As Hurd sees it, ‘legitimacy’ is a 
term often used by the international community when discussing UNSC reform without 
true understanding of what an illegitimate Council would look like. If the Council were 
truly lacking legitimacy in its current form, Hurd argues, its decisions would not be 
respected and States would not show a desire to be involved in the body. The lively 
debates on which States deserve representation seem to confirm the legitimacy of the 
body. 
Additionally, the very nature of the Security Council was to have a small number 
of States confer to make urgent decisions efficiently. Adding seats to the Council could 
prove detrimental to the body’s very functioning. Bosco asserts that “at fifteen members, 
the council is already close to its maximum effective capacity,” referencing the 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 109. 
33
 Hurd, 200. 
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14 
unproductive nature of the Council when its sessions focus on speech-making rather than 
policy and action.
35
 However, Bosco seems to acknowledge that the body’s legitimacy 
would improve with the addition of new members. Bosco concedes that expansion would 
bestow legitimacy on the Council, though the value of such legitimacy may be 
counteracted by the impact expansion might have on the speed of decisions reached.   
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Theory  
 In order to argue that the Group of Four (G4)’s plan is too controversial to pass 
and Brazil’s bid, while compelling, is not strong enough to convince the global 
community or the P5, I will critically examine the viewpoint that the council ‘ain’t broke’ 
and determine if there is a chance at reform, specifically through the addition of Brazil as 
a permanent member of the Council. While reform seems more likely than ever before, 
due to increased rhetoric of reform and pressure on the P5 by other Member States, the 
structure and politics of the Council and the international system in general will likely 
block the G4’s proposal, and that of any other group, in the foreseeable future.  
How does the Charter allow for structural reform of the Security Council and how 
would the veto impact such reform? This theory analysis will discuss the history of the 
veto’s inclusion in the Charter and its use, as well as more details about organizational 
legitimacy and its connection to the Security Council’s membership. A more concrete 
discussion of a reform plan, specifically that proposed by the Group of Four, will use this 
theory to frame the argument that Brazil will not be added as a permanent member of the 
Council.  
Organizational Membership and Legitimacy 
International actors experience both freedom and limitations due to the structure 
of the international system. Unlike the situation within individual states, there is no 
overarching international government in the anarchic global system. States are sovereign 
entities with control of their own territories and no intrinsic connection to other states. 
This means decisions are difficult to enforce and authority is not inherent, but earned. 
16 
This lack of legal authority means international organizations must develop a sense of 
legitimacy to members which have no legal obligation to continue to abide by the 
organization’s guidelines and decisions. This legitimation is important in maintaining 
peace in the international system itself.  
At one point in time, legitimacy simply referred to military strength of a 
government and its ability to maintain a monopoly of use of force within the state’s 
borders.
36
 The Treaty of Westphalia, which granted states sovereignty over their territory 
and people, has been expanded upon since its coming into effect in 1648. Instead of 
simply referring to military strength and monopoly of force, legitimacy now refers to a 
social buy-in from citizens, other states, and non-governmental organizations. This 
legitimacy can still apply to a state but can also apply to organizations. In the case of the 
Security Council’s legitimacy, one must question whether States Council and the United 
Nations as a whole, whether the Member States of the organization go to the Council or 
surpass it, and if the Council carries out its mandate.   
The League of Nations, which was the predecessor to the United Nations, was an 
attempt to create an organization of States which would ensure collective security after 
World War I. However, the organization failed to do so and was officially disbanded in 
1946 after the end of the Second World War. One of the major factors of the League of 
Nations’ demise was its membership. The legitimacy of the body was seriously 
undermined because not all of the world’s major actors were party to the League. 
Without key players such as the United States, decisions the League made lacked the 
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weight of international consensus and were easily ignored by the international 
community.  
The Security Council’s Membership and the Question of Legitimacy  
Any body’s legitimacy comes, in part, from its membership. As international  
power continues to shift between countries, the Security Council risks losing its 
perceived legitimacy and, therefore, authority if the membership of the Council does not 
change to reflect that shifting power. Because the world is an anarchic system, the only 
binding force committing States to Security Council decisions is the perceived authority 
of the body. The Council in its current formation and make-up risks being perceived as 
the P5 enacting their will upon States who are not given representation despite large 
financial contributions, regional power, or cultural influence. Losing legitimacy would be 
disastrous for the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. The United 
Nations’ Charter tasks the organization with maintaining international peace and security 
and the Council is at the heart of this mandate. Without the enforcement of the Council, 
the entire organization is at risk of falling apart, as was the case with the League of 
Nations. As a British diplomat noted in 1923 when discussing the League of Nations’ 
true value, “the strongest weapon we have is the weapon of public opinion.”37 Public 
opinion was not in support of the Council around the world, and the League’s failed 
legacy provides a clear demonstration to the international community of the value and 
necessity of legitimacy in the eyes of all States in the world, not simply some of the most 
powerful. 
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The United Nations has been more successful at guaranteeing the participation of 
the most powerful States, and it did so by providing those who were most powerful at the 
inception of the UN a veto in the body’s most powerful organ – the Security Council. Yet 
that power distribution has shifted since 1945 without such changes reflected in the 
UNSC. The United Nations Security Council is a very public example of an organization 
whose membership comes into question during discussions of legitimacy. Any 
organization needs to be able to justify its inequalities in membership in order to maintain 
legitimacy and trust in the eyes of its members.  Because of the Security Council’s unique 
authority to impact international security, it is essential for the States of the world to 
continue to see the Council as legitimate in order to avoid the fate of the League of 
Nations.   
Understanding the Veto and Its Use 
The veto has been a point of contention in most discussions of reform of the 
Council. It is essential to understand the frequency of the use of veto power in order to 
fully appreciate the calls for reform from around the world. There have been twenty five 
vetoes in the past fifteen years: 9 of these were cast by the Russian Federation, five by 
China, and 11 by the United States.
38
  No vetoes have been cast by either France or the 
United Kingdom in this time period. In fact, both France and the UK’s most recent vetoes 
were cast in 1989 on the topic of the situation in Panama.
39
   
Twenty-five vetoes in fifteen years is, however, a drastic decrease from veto use 
in the early years of the organization. By the United Nations’ tenth anniversary, 79 vetoes 
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had been cast, 77 of which were from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cast its 100th 
veto in the Security Council in June of 1962, just seventeen years after the Council’s 
inception.
40
  Such excessive veto use can be attributed in large part to the Cold War; 
Richard Hiscocks describes the Soviet veto use during this time period as “without 
restraint and sometimes little wisdom, but their action was hardly more culpable than the 
obvious satisfaction of the United States in using the UN as an instrument of Western 
policy.”41  
While this unfettered use of veto power seriously slowed down following the end 
of the Cold War, it seems to have drastically affected the world’s opinion of the veto 
entirely. As Bosco notes, the veto was intended to be a “safety valve” to protect only the 
most vital national interests and objectives, rather than a way to force the Council’s hand 
on a wide variety of resolutions. The use of the veto is often seen to be a self-interested 
power of the elite P5 which prevents necessary action the Council is mandated to take by 
the Charter. However, it is more than unlikely that any reform including additional veto-
holding seats would ever pass through the Security Council without a veto from any of 
the existing P5. A single veto to a reform proposal would effectively kill the bid and 
result in no change to the Council’s composition. Therefore, any reform plan needs to 
both have the support of a super-majority of the General Assembly as well as the outright 
support of each permanent member. 
There are many, however, who dispute the radical nature of the veto entirely. 
Mingst and Karns note that the ratification of the UN Charter which included the veto in 
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1945 was a resignation to the UN’s limitations and an understanding that the body could 
not realistically carry out enforcement against the UN’s most powerful members who 
were, at the time, the P5.
42
 There is a general understanding in the international 
community that any UNSC reform proposal will not address the veto.  A high level panel 
held in 2005 called for a complete review of Security Council membership and structure 
to be completed in 2020, which could make decisions for a formal recommendation on 
reform measures.
43
 
 Despite reform being seriously needed, I argue that it is unlikely due to structural 
constraints within the Council and the GA. Even a state whose membership would 
increase the legitimacy of the body, such as Brazil, will not gain the support of the P5 and 
be able to overcome such obstacles to admission, because of the veto and disagreements 
within regions as to which State should gain permanent representation on the Council. 
The P5 have a wide range of opinions and policies regarding UNSC reform and will not 
come to an agreement on such an issue in order to avoid a single veto. Additionally, there 
is not a consensus within the GA which would allow for a proposal to come to a vote and 
reach the necessary two-thirds majority. Ultimately, reform is best to occur through 
operational rather than structural means.  
 
  
                                                 
42
 The United Nations in the 21
st
 Century, pg. 32 
43
 Center for UN Reform pg. 2  
http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Special%20Paper%20No.%204.pdf 
21 
Research Design 
One of the reform proposals with the most traction is that proposed by the Group 
of Four (G4). This group consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan and is an 
agreement to support each other country’s bid for permanent representation on the 
Security Council. The G4 also supports the addition of two permanent seats to be given to 
African States, though there is no consensus regarding which two States would be given 
such representation. The G4 proposal, initially brought to the UN in 2004, has both been 
revised and refined and seen extensive discussion in the international arena. Because the 
G4 has one of the clearest proposals for reform with significant support, it will be used to 
analyze the politics and likelihood of reform.  
However, to conduct an in-depth analysis of the G4 proposal for permanent seats 
to the Security Council, this paper will focus on a case study of Brazil, the only G4 
member in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is often seen as the least controversial 
member of the G4, and as such, analyzing its candidacy is an interesting endeavor. 
Germany’s bid is hotly contested by Italy as well as countries which see the possibility of 
a third Western European seat as problematic. India, though recently endorsed by the 
United States, is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
therefore has opponents who find its lack of participation in one of the world’s most 
important security agreements concerning.
44
 Additionally, Pakistan and its allies are 
staunchly opposed to India’s accession to permanent status on the Council. Finally, Japan 
has clear opponent in China and the Republic of Korea; though Japan’s influence in 
global politics is obvious, its challenge by a member of the P5 makes its permanent 
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representation unlikely.  While there are certainly opponents to Brazil’s candidacy, and 
weaknesses in its proposal, Brazil has the least obvious obstacles to its bid, making the 
study both interesting and enlightening about this possibility for reform. 
In conducting this case study, I will look at the main arguments for Brazil’s 
addition to the Council in a permanent capacity, analyze Brazil’s contributions to the UN 
and its influence regionally and internationally, and break down the arguments against 
the bid by Brazil’s strongest opponents. Brazil’s financial contributions to the United 
Nations’ operating budget, contributions of personnel and technology to UN 
peacekeeping, its participation in major international alliances and organizations, and its 
perception in Latin America are all major factors impacting its proposal. I will also look 
at the viewpoint of each P5 Member State on the question of Brazil; because reform must 
have the support of each P5 State in order to not be vetoed, the viewpoints of China, 
France, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States are of paramount 
importance. 
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Case Study: Brazil 
The Case of Brazil 
Brazil’s inclusion in the G4 is an attempt to give Latin America permanent 
representation on the Council. However, does Brazil truly represent the interests of Latin 
America and have the support of the region? Additionally, does Brazil – a Portuguese 
rather than Spanish-speaking developing State – have the international power to justify its 
inclusion in the G4 proposal? Former President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
publicly called for reform in 2008 at the United Nations, declaring “The United Nations 
has spent 15 years discussing the reform of its Security Council. Today’s structure has 
been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its 
distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we 
aspire. Therefore I am much encouraged by the General Assembly’s decision to launch 
negotiations in the near future on the reform of the Security Council.”45 
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and largest in South America, in 
terms of both territory held and population.
46
 Additionally, Brazil’s economy is rapidly 
expanding and it was one of the first major international players to recover from the 2008 
recession. Brazil’s aspiration for a permanent seat on the Security Council is related to 
these facts and there are three main tenets to Brazil’s claim to permanent representation 
in the Council: its financial contributions to the UN’s operating budget, contributions of 
personnel to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) missions, and 
                                                 
45
 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. " "Statement by H.E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil." 
Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York City, New York, September 23, 2008. 
46
 The World Factbook 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013 . 
24 
membership in notable alliance groups. These three factors, according to Brazil, place the 
country in a unique position to deserve permanent representation in the Council.   
Brazil’s Financial Contributions to the UN Operating Budget 
Questions about the legitimacy of the P5 in the Security Council often include 
discussion of the body’s finances, as some States associate a financial contribution with 
being deserving of additional power or representation in the UN. The United States is 
clearly the largest contributor to the UN’s operating budget, providing about 22% of the 
organization’s money.47 However, the second and third highest contributors, Japan and 
Germany respectively, do not hold permanent representation on the Council.
48
 The 
United Kingdom is the fourth highest contributor at 6.604% and France is the fifth at 
6.123%.
49
 China and Russia contribute significantly less and are the eighth and fifteenth 
largest contributors, respectively, each providing less than 2% of the budget of the United 
Nations.
50
 Many states question why the power of the veto is not accompanied by a 
significant fiduciary responsibility to the organization.   
Brazil boasts the seventh largest economy in the world according to the 
International Monetary Fund with a GDP of $2.24 trillion USD.
51
 Brazil also contributed 
2.934% of the United Nations’ working budget in 2014, making it the 10th largest 
contributor of the UN’s 193 Member States.52 This contribution was more than even 
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Russia’s, though Russia is a permanent member of the Council. Certainly permanent 
seats on the Security Council should not be up for sale, but such major contributions, 
some argue, signify a deep commitment to the organization and its goals. Brazil’s 
financial contributions to the United Nations have historically been some of the highest 
of any of the organization’s members and have been in the top 15 for more than twenty 
years.
53
 
Brazilian Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions  
Brazil has a long history with UN peacekeeping and is the 19
th
 largest contributor 
of military and police personnel to UN operations, with 1,692 Brazilians actively 
deployed as of February 2015.
54
 Brazil’s contributions to peacekeeping personnel are 
higher than those of each P5 other than China, which contributes the 11
th
 highest 
personnel contributions.
55
 Though the P5 are required to pay a premium for peacekeeping 
missions due to the Security Council’s ability to deploy troops, this clearly does not 
correlate with an equally high personnel contribution. France is the 32
nd
 highest 
contributor with 920 peacekeepers, followed by the UK with 289 peacekeepers as the 51
st 
highest contributor, USA the 66
th 
with 119 deployed, and Russia as the 77
th 
highest 
contributor with only 72 deployed peacekeepers.
56
 Additionally, Brazil’s contributions 
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are the second highest of the G4, eclipsed only by India whose 8,116 peacekeepers make 
it the third highest contributor of any UN Member State to UN peacekeeping missions.
57
 
Brazilian peacekeeping personnel are currently engaged in ten of the sixteen 
active DPKO missions in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Abyei Area of Sudan (UNISFA), Liberia 
(UNMIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI).58 Since 1956, Brazil 
has engaged in 46 of 65 UN peacekeeping missions and contributed a total of over 12,000 
peacekeeping personnel around the world.
59
 However, Santos and Cravo argue that 
Brazil’s attitude toward peacekeeping changed after MINUSTAH in 2004 to be much 
more oriented toward leadership roles, favoring missions neither in Portuguese-speaking 
countries nor in countries directly related to Brazilian interests.
60
 This shift away from 
non-interventionist policies coincided with a stronger push for UN reform as Brazil has 
actively pursued permanent representation in the UNSC. 
Brazil as a Major International Player 
Brazil is part of many notable international organizations and alliance groups in 
addition to the Group of Four. These international recognitions set Brazil in a position to 
significantly influence a vote for representation in its favor. This demonstrates not only 
                                                 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Mission's Contributions by Country, February 28, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/feb15_5.pdf. 
59
 Rita Santos and Teresa Almeida Cravo, “Brazil’s rising profile in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations since the end of the cold war ,”Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2014, 
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/47c24376b182eb29154461520d5
ba7e9.pdf 
60
 Ibid.  
27 
Brazil’s commitment to international leadership but the international community’s 
willingness to collaborate with Brazil as well.  
Brazil’s membership and participation in international economic and political 
alliances has placed the country in a position of influence in both South America and the 
global arena. Some of these groups include the Group of Twenty (G20), the Group of 
Eight Plus Five (G8+5), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and the Group of 
Seventy-Seven. These groups are primarily focused on economics and development; 
Brazil’s inclusion in such organizations shows its commitment to being a strong player in 
both the global economy and international politics.  
Brazil was also recognized by economist Jim O’Neil in 2001 as one of four 
countries whose economy would eclipse those of the largest economies in the world (the 
G7) by 2050.
61
 These BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – are seen to 
have economies which are growing at an accelerated rate when compared to those of the 
G7. As time passes, many political scientists and economists argue that these four 
countries will have an unprecedented impact on both the global economy and 
international politics.  
Brazil’s Regional Opponents 
Latin American news reports and studies provide insight as to Latin perceptions 
of Brazil as an international actor and representative of the region. Argentina is often 
seen as Brazil’s strongest Latin opponent to the G4 plan for permanent representation. 
Argentina is one of the founding members of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) 
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movement, also known as the Coffee Club, in which Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica 
are also core members.
62
 This Latin American presence presents significant regional 
challenge to Brazil’s desire to be seen as the sole permanent representative of the region 
to the Council.  
It is, however, important to understand how Brazil is perceived in Latin America 
to determine whether Brazil truly represents the region’s interests. Mexico and Argentina 
are often seen to be Brazil’s largest competitors to permanent representation in the 
Council, and therefore their opinions on UNSC reform are likely to be taken with high 
regard by the international community.  
The Mexican Center of Documentation, Information and Analysis outlined 
Mexico’s stance on proposals for Security Council reform in 2008, specifically the plan 
put forward by the Group of Four. Mexico unequivocally opposes Brazil’s bid for a 
permanent seat on the Security Council, advocating instead for the addition of ten 
nonpermanent rotating seats to the Council which would be assigned based on region.
63
 
This proposal, originally from the Coffee Club, would increase African and Latin 
American representation significantly without making changes to either the permanent 
members in the Council or the veto. The report discusses extreme frustration with the 
Council’s current structure, calling the body an anachronism of the era after WWII which 
no longer reflects the landscape of power that currently exists in the international arena.
64
 
The report continues, affirming that while structural reform of the Security Council is 
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important, the most urgent area for improvement in the Council is in transparency and 
appropriately carrying out the Council’s mandate.65 
Andrés Malamud, an Argentinian researcher, analyzed the Brazilian bid for 
permanent representation and Brazilian politics more generally, in A Leader Without 
Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of 
Brazilian Foreign Policy. Malamud argues that, though Brazil strongly desires to be 
considered a regional leader, its neighbors do not follow its direction in the way 
neighbors of more powerful States do.
66
Malamud considers leadership to be distinct from 
the concept of hegemony; while the latter is “the capacity of a powerful state to dictate 
policies to other states,” the former is simply “the capacity to win and influence 
followers.”67 This leadership must therefore be accompanied by what Malamud calls 
“followership.”68 Malamud sees Brazil as a State which is considered a leader by States 
outside the region more often than by its own neighbors.  
Malamud ultimately argues that this regional resistance means that if Brazil 
desires global leadership, it will need to achieve it without the support of the region.
69
 
This assessment seems to be similar to the policy of Argentina itself, as Argentina’s 
participation in the Uniting for Consensus group demonstrates its opposition to Brazil’s 
rise as a regional leader. While Argentina and Mexico are certainly the strongest and 
most vocal opponents to Brazil’s bid for representation, Brazil maintains strong relations 
with the rest of the world and may not need the regions support, as Malamud argues.  
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Findings  
The Vote for Brazil in the Council and the General Assembly 
In 2013, David Bosco analyzed how a vote for the G4 may turn out if it were ever 
brought to the Security Council. In this article, Bosco notes that disagreements between 
regional bodies in determining their own candidates may benefit the UNSC P5. Because 
such regional groups cannot come to agreements regarding which countries should be 
nominated to permanent membership to the Council, the P5 have the ability to seem to 
support reform without committing to a specific reform plan.
70
 Until the General 
Assembly can develop a proposal which could garner two-thirds of the body’s support, 
the Security Council will not need to vote on a proposal and will not be required to 
commit to their rhetoric.  
Two thirds of the General Assembly in its current membership would be 
equivalent to 129 States. This means that any reform plan may only have a maximum of 
64 votes against it in order for the plan to pass and therefore move to a vote in the 
Security Council. Unfortunately for the G4, 75 countries attended a Uniting for 
Consensus summit in 2009 in which alternatives to the G4 proposal were discussed.
71
 
This shows, if not outright support for the Uniting for Consensus plan, at least broad 
support for an alternative plan to that of the G4.While the G4, UK, and France were not 
invited, China and Russia both sent high-level officials.
72
 Additionally, the United States 
participated in the summit as an observer.
73
 While there is no guarantee that all 75 
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attendees of the summit would vote against a G4 proposal, there is a significant chance 
that the plan could not obtain the required 129 yes votes. 
Bosco continues to build upon this separation between P5 members and their 
approach to UNSC reform, noting that the dynamics of the P5’s discussions of formal 
reform show an interesting divide between France and the UK and China, Russia, and the 
United States.
74
 The former seem to have committed to supporting specific reform plans 
while the latter have been less willing to support any one proposal, choosing instead to 
discuss broad, mission-fulfillment-based reform.  
France has historically been the member of the P5 most supportive of formal 
reform of the Council. One of France’s most recent statements to the UN on the subject 
of reform came in September 2009. Ambassador Gérard Araud stated that any reform 
“must take into account the emergence of new powers that possess the willingness to 
assume the responsibility of a permanent seat in the Security Council and that are, in line 
with the United Nations Charter, able to make a significant contribution to the Council's 
actions in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this respect, we support 
the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status.”75 The 
United Kingdom is also publicly supportive of formal reform to the Council. In 
November 2014, the UK clearly stated its position in a speech to the General Assembly, 
telling the committee, “You are all familiar with the United Kingdom’s position on 
Security Council reform. It has not changed. The United Kingdom supports new 
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permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside permanent African 
representation. We also support a modest expansion in non-permanent seats.”76 
The United States, China, and Russia have been less clear in their desires for 
UNSC reform. While the United States has recently increased its rhetoric in favor of 
reform, these statements have not been met with tangible support for any reform plan. In 
2009, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice stated that  
“The United States believes that the long-term legitimacy and viability of the 
United Nations Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the 21st 
century. As such, we will make a serious, deliberate effort, working with partners 
and allies, to find a way forward that enhances the ability of the Security Council 
to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of the new century... I 
would also note that we support expansion of the Security Council in a way that 
will not diminish its effectiveness or its efficiency. And finally, the United States 
will take into account the ability of countries to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and the other purposes of the United Nations.”77 
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Ultimately, a vote for Brazil through the G4 would not pass without a veto in the 
current political climate. The G4 position requires Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan to 
support each other’s bids, and the proposal for one would not come to the attention of the 
Council without that of the other three G4 members. Yet China would immediately veto 
any proposal containing Japan in the existing political climate. Therefore, without a 
serious change of policy on the part of China, Russia, and the United States, the G4 plan 
seems to be an unrealistic one. However, the P5 are not the States blocking the G4’s plan 
at the present moment. A vote in the Security Council for reform would only occur after 
two-thirds of the GA agreed to the proposal. Until such an agreement occurs, the P5’s 
policies and desires for reform have little impact. 
Outlook of and Alternatives to the Council 
The 2020 Review of the Security Council’s membership and structure offers a 
unique opportunity for the UN to make meaningful strides on increasing adequate 
representation in the body. If significant pressure is placed upon the P5 to support reform 
actively rather than passively, it is not inconceivable that the Council could be reformed. 
Ultimately, it is essential for all Member States of the UN to believe in the legitimacy of 
the Council if the United Nations is to remain a relevant and respected institution. 
Unequal representation in the Council past the 2020 review date may signify to smaller 
States that the United Nations’ most powerful body undertakes the will of the most 
powerful rather than for the defense of all States and persons. Therefore, the P5 should 
find it in their best interests to make concessions in order to bolster the perception of the 
Council worldwide.  
34 
An innovative suggestion for compromise between the Group of Four and the 
Coffee Club proposals is to instate “dual seating,” as originally named by Professor Louis 
Sohn, former president of The American Society for International Law. This suggestion 
would give a permanent seat to two governments who would share the responsibility and 
coordinate in decision making, while rotating the representative in the Council every two 
years. Though unlikely to pass, this proposal seems to solve some issues of competition 
for regional supremacy, as is the case in Latin America and Africa. 
In what could be seen as a response to decreased confidence in the Security 
Council, many States have been showing preference to regional organizations rather than 
the United Nations system. The European Union, founded in 1993, has increased in both 
membership and reach in the 21
st
 century. Many of its Member States, such as Poland, 
have publically shown deference to these regional organizations rather than the UN, due 
to perceptions of increased power and influence in the decisions made at the regional 
level.  
Conclusions  
 Reform of the Security Council is not a new debate, and there is no easy solution 
to the issue. The global community agrees that the body is not as representative as it 
should be, both in terms of geography and distribution of global power. However, there is 
no consensus in how to solve such an issue. Additionally, the structure of the Council 
itself is detrimental to any pursuits of reform, as even a single veto from any member of 
the P5 would end the proposal’s chances at adoption. The veto allows any member of the 
P5 to vote against any measure which would dilute their power, influence or prestige. 
35 
These limitations are written into the Charter itself, making structural reform much more 
difficult than reprioritization and enhanced mission fulfillment.  
Brazil is an ideal case study to demonstrate such constraints; though Brazil has 
few major opponents to its bid for permanent representation, is economically strong, and 
makes major contributions to both the UN operating budget and DPKO, it is unlikely to 
receive a permanent seat on the Security Council. Brazil’s alliance with Germany, India, 
and Japan provides it with vast support for its bid. However, this grouping has also pitted 
Brazil against the opponents of the other G4 members as well as its own regional rivals. 
 This resistance to structural reform is not to say, however, that the body will 
become obsolete. The UN and the Security Council are both major institutions in the 
international arena. The concern is not with the body’s existence but its ability to carry 
out its mandate effectively and with the respect of the world’s most and least powerful 
States. The 2020 High Level Review will be an important opportunity for States to 
discuss their desires for reform, find similarities, and compromise to make the Security 
Council represent the state of global power that it did at its creation. As pressure on the 
P5 to reform intensifies, concessions may become a more feasible solution.  
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Somehow we must be able to show people that democracy is not about words, but action. 
-Eleanor Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East (1953) 
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